website/content/en/docs/concepts/configuration/secret.md

772 lines
26 KiB
Markdown

---
reviewers:
- mikedanese
title: Secrets
content_template: templates/concept
weight: 50
---
{{< toc >}}
{{% capture overview %}}
Objects of type `secret` are intended to hold sensitive information, such as
passwords, OAuth tokens, and ssh keys. Putting this information in a `secret`
is safer and more flexible than putting it verbatim in a `pod` definition or in
a docker image. See [Secrets design document](https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/design-proposals/auth/secrets.md) for more information.
{{% /capture %}}
{{% capture body %}}
## Overview of Secrets
A Secret is an object that contains a small amount of sensitive data such as
a password, a token, or a key. Such information might otherwise be put in a
Pod specification or in an image; putting it in a Secret object allows for
more control over how it is used, and reduces the risk of accidental exposure.
Users can create secrets, and the system also creates some secrets.
To use a secret, a pod needs to reference the secret.
A secret can be used with a pod in two ways: as files in a [volume](/docs/concepts/storage/volumes/) mounted on one or more of
its containers, or used by kubelet when pulling images for the pod.
### Built-in Secrets
#### Service Accounts Automatically Create and Attach Secrets with API Credentials
Kubernetes automatically creates secrets which contain credentials for
accessing the API and it automatically modifies your pods to use this type of
secret.
The automatic creation and use of API credentials can be disabled or overridden
if desired. However, if all you need to do is securely access the apiserver,
this is the recommended workflow.
See the [Service Account](/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/) documentation for more
information on how Service Accounts work.
### Creating your own Secrets
#### Creating a Secret Using kubectl create secret
Say that some pods need to access a database. The
username and password that the pods should use is in the files
`./username.txt` and `./password.txt` on your local machine.
```shell
# Create files needed for rest of example.
$ echo -n 'admin' > ./username.txt
$ echo -n '1f2d1e2e67df' > ./password.txt
```
The `kubectl create secret` command
packages these files into a Secret and creates
the object on the Apiserver.
```shell
$ kubectl create secret generic db-user-pass --from-file=./username.txt --from-file=./password.txt
secret "db-user-pass" created
```
You can check that the secret was created like this:
```shell
$ kubectl get secrets
NAME TYPE DATA AGE
db-user-pass Opaque 2 51s
$ kubectl describe secrets/db-user-pass
Name: db-user-pass
Namespace: default
Labels: <none>
Annotations: <none>
Type: Opaque
Data
====
password.txt: 12 bytes
username.txt: 5 bytes
```
Note that neither `get` nor `describe` shows the contents of the file by default.
This is to protect the secret from being exposed accidentally to someone looking
or from being stored in a terminal log.
See [decoding a secret](#decoding-a-secret) for how to see the contents.
#### Creating a Secret Manually
You can also create a secret object in a file first,
in json or yaml format, and then create that object.
Each item must be base64 encoded:
```shell
$ echo -n 'admin' | base64
YWRtaW4=
$ echo -n '1f2d1e2e67df' | base64
MWYyZDFlMmU2N2Rm
```
Now write a secret object that looks like this:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: mysecret
type: Opaque
data:
username: YWRtaW4=
password: MWYyZDFlMmU2N2Rm
```
The data field is a map. Its keys must consist of alphanumeric characters, '-', '_' or '.'. The values are arbitrary data, encoded using base64.
Create the secret using [`kubectl create`](/docs/reference/generated/kubectl/kubectl-commands#create):
```shell
$ kubectl create -f ./secret.yaml
secret "mysecret" created
```
**Encoding Note:** The serialized JSON and YAML values of secret data are
encoded as base64 strings. Newlines are not valid within these strings and must
be omitted. When using the `base64` utility on Darwin/OS X users should avoid
using the `-b` option to split long lines. Conversely Linux users *should* add
the option `-w 0` to `base64` commands or the pipeline `base64 | tr -d '\n'` if
`-w` option is not available.
#### Decoding a Secret
Secrets can be retrieved via the `kubectl get secret` command. For example, to retrieve the secret created in the previous section:
```shell
$ kubectl get secret mysecret -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
data:
username: YWRtaW4=
password: MWYyZDFlMmU2N2Rm
kind: Secret
metadata:
creationTimestamp: 2016-01-22T18:41:56Z
name: mysecret
namespace: default
resourceVersion: "164619"
selfLink: /api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets/mysecret
uid: cfee02d6-c137-11e5-8d73-42010af00002
type: Opaque
```
Decode the password field:
```shell
$ echo 'MWYyZDFlMmU2N2Rm' | base64 --decode
1f2d1e2e67df
```
### Using Secrets
Secrets can be mounted as data volumes or be exposed as environment variables to
be used by a container in a pod. They can also be used by other parts of the
system, without being directly exposed to the pod. For example, they can hold
credentials that other parts of the system should use to interact with external
systems on your behalf.
#### Using Secrets as Files from a Pod
To consume a Secret in a volume in a Pod:
1. Create a secret or use an existing one. Multiple pods can reference the same secret.
1. Modify your Pod definition to add a volume under `.spec.volumes[]`. Name the volume anything, and have a `.spec.volumes[].secret.secretName` field equal to the name of the secret object.
1. Add a `.spec.containers[].volumeMounts[]` to each container that needs the secret. Specify `.spec.containers[].volumeMounts[].readOnly = true` and `.spec.containers[].volumeMounts[].mountPath` to an unused directory name where you would like the secrets to appear.
1. Modify your image and/or command line so that the program looks for files in that directory. Each key in the secret `data` map becomes the filename under `mountPath`.
This is an example of a pod that mounts a secret in a volume:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: mypod
spec:
containers:
- name: mypod
image: redis
volumeMounts:
- name: foo
mountPath: "/etc/foo"
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: foo
secret:
secretName: mysecret
```
Each secret you want to use needs to be referred to in `.spec.volumes`.
If there are multiple containers in the pod, then each container needs its
own `volumeMounts` block, but only one `.spec.volumes` is needed per secret.
You can package many files into one secret, or use many secrets, whichever is convenient.
**Projection of secret keys to specific paths**
We can also control the paths within the volume where Secret keys are projected.
You can use `.spec.volumes[].secret.items` field to change target path of each key:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: mypod
spec:
containers:
- name: mypod
image: redis
volumeMounts:
- name: foo
mountPath: "/etc/foo"
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: foo
secret:
secretName: mysecret
items:
- key: username
path: my-group/my-username
```
What will happen:
* `username` secret is stored under `/etc/foo/my-group/my-username` file instead of `/etc/foo/username`.
* `password` secret is not projected
If `.spec.volumes[].secret.items` is used, only keys specified in `items` are projected.
To consume all keys from the secret, all of them must be listed in the `items` field.
All listed keys must exist in the corresponding secret. Otherwise, the volume is not created.
**Secret files permissions**
You can also specify the permission mode bits files part of a secret will have.
If you don't specify any, `0644` is used by default. You can specify a default
mode for the whole secret volume and override per key if needed.
For example, you can specify a default mode like this:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: mypod
spec:
containers:
- name: mypod
image: redis
volumeMounts:
- name: foo
mountPath: "/etc/foo"
volumes:
- name: foo
secret:
secretName: mysecret
defaultMode: 256
```
Then, the secret will be mounted on `/etc/foo` and all the files created by the
secret volume mount will have permission `0400`.
Note that the JSON spec doesn't support octal notation, so use the value 256 for
0400 permissions. If you use yaml instead of json for the pod, you can use octal
notation to specify permissions in a more natural way.
You can also use mapping, as in the previous example, and specify different
permission for different files like this:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: mypod
spec:
containers:
- name: mypod
image: redis
volumeMounts:
- name: foo
mountPath: "/etc/foo"
volumes:
- name: foo
secret:
secretName: mysecret
items:
- key: username
path: my-group/my-username
mode: 511
```
In this case, the file resulting in `/etc/foo/my-group/my-username` will have
permission value of `0777`. Owing to JSON limitations, you must specify the mode
in decimal notation.
Note that this permission value might be displayed in decimal notation if you
read it later.
**Consuming Secret Values from Volumes**
Inside the container that mounts a secret volume, the secret keys appear as
files and the secret values are base-64 decoded and stored inside these files.
This is the result of commands
executed inside the container from the example above:
```shell
$ ls /etc/foo/
username
password
$ cat /etc/foo/username
admin
$ cat /etc/foo/password
1f2d1e2e67df
```
The program in a container is responsible for reading the secrets from the
files.
**Mounted Secrets are updated automatically**
When a secret being already consumed in a volume is updated, projected keys are eventually updated as well.
Kubelet is checking whether the mounted secret is fresh on every periodic sync.
However, it is using its local ttl-based cache for getting the current value of the secret.
As a result, the total delay from the moment when the secret is updated to the moment when new keys are
projected to the pod can be as long as kubelet sync period + ttl of secrets cache in kubelet.
{{< note >}}
**Note:** A container using a Secret as a
[subPath](/docs/concepts/storage/volumes#using-subpath) volume mount will not receive
Secret updates.
{{< /note >}}
#### Using Secrets as Environment Variables
To use a secret in an environment variable in a pod:
1. Create a secret or use an existing one. Multiple pods can reference the same secret.
1. Modify your Pod definition in each container that you wish to consume the value of a secret key to add an environment variable for each secret key you wish to consume. The environment variable that consumes the secret key should populate the secret's name and key in `env[].valueFrom.secretKeyRef`.
1. Modify your image and/or command line so that the program looks for values in the specified environment variables
This is an example of a pod that uses secrets from environment variables:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: secret-env-pod
spec:
containers:
- name: mycontainer
image: redis
env:
- name: SECRET_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: mysecret
key: username
- name: SECRET_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: mysecret
key: password
restartPolicy: Never
```
**Consuming Secret Values from Environment Variables**
Inside a container that consumes a secret in an environment variables, the secret keys appear as
normal environment variables containing the base-64 decoded values of the secret data.
This is the result of commands executed inside the container from the example above:
```shell
$ echo $SECRET_USERNAME
admin
$ echo $SECRET_PASSWORD
1f2d1e2e67df
```
#### Using imagePullSecrets
An imagePullSecret is a way to pass a secret that contains a Docker (or other) image registry
password to the Kubelet so it can pull a private image on behalf of your Pod.
**Manually specifying an imagePullSecret**
Use of imagePullSecrets is described in the [images documentation](/docs/concepts/containers/images/#specifying-imagepullsecrets-on-a-pod)
### Arranging for imagePullSecrets to be Automatically Attached
You can manually create an imagePullSecret, and reference it from
a serviceAccount. Any pods created with that serviceAccount
or that default to use that serviceAccount, will get their imagePullSecret
field set to that of the service account.
See [Add ImagePullSecrets to a service account](/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/#add-imagepullsecrets-to-a-service-account)
for a detailed explanation of that process.
### Automatic Mounting of Manually Created Secrets
Manually created secrets (e.g. one containing a token for accessing a github account)
can be automatically attached to pods based on their service account.
See [Injecting Information into Pods Using a PodPreset](/docs/tasks/inject-data-application/podpreset/) for a detailed explanation of that process.
## Details
### Restrictions
Secret volume sources are validated to ensure that the specified object
reference actually points to an object of type `Secret`. Therefore, a secret
needs to be created before any pods that depend on it.
Secret API objects reside in a namespace. They can only be referenced by pods
in that same namespace.
Individual secrets are limited to 1MB in size. This is to discourage creation
of very large secrets which would exhaust apiserver and kubelet memory.
However, creation of many smaller secrets could also exhaust memory. More
comprehensive limits on memory usage due to secrets is a planned feature.
Kubelet only supports use of secrets for Pods it gets from the API server.
This includes any pods created using kubectl, or indirectly via a replication
controller. It does not include pods created via the kubelets
`--manifest-url` flag, its `--config` flag, or its REST API (these are
not common ways to create pods.)
Secrets must be created before they are consumed in pods as environment
variables unless they are marked as optional. References to Secrets that do not exist will prevent
the pod from starting.
References via `secretKeyRef` to keys that do not exist in a named Secret
will prevent the pod from starting.
Secrets used to populate environment variables via `envFrom` that have keys
that are considered invalid environment variable names will have those keys
skipped. The pod will be allowed to start. There will be an event whose
reason is `InvalidVariableNames` and the message will contain the list of
invalid keys that were skipped. The example shows a pod which refers to the
default/mysecret that contains 2 invalid keys, 1badkey and 2alsobad.
```shell
$ kubectl get events
LASTSEEN FIRSTSEEN COUNT NAME KIND SUBOBJECT TYPE REASON
0s 0s 1 dapi-test-pod Pod Warning InvalidEnvironmentVariableNames kubelet, 127.0.0.1 Keys [1badkey, 2alsobad] from the EnvFrom secret default/mysecret were skipped since they are considered invalid environment variable names.
```
### Secret and Pod Lifetime interaction
When a pod is created via the API, there is no check whether a referenced
secret exists. Once a pod is scheduled, the kubelet will try to fetch the
secret value. If the secret cannot be fetched because it does not exist or
because of a temporary lack of connection to the API server, kubelet will
periodically retry. It will report an event about the pod explaining the
reason it is not started yet. Once the secret is fetched, the kubelet will
create and mount a volume containing it. None of the pod's containers will
start until all the pod's volumes are mounted.
## Use cases
### Use-Case: Pod with ssh keys
Create a secret containing some ssh keys:
```shell
$ kubectl create secret generic ssh-key-secret --from-file=ssh-privatekey=/path/to/.ssh/id_rsa --from-file=ssh-publickey=/path/to/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
```
**Security Note:** think carefully before sending your own ssh keys: other users of the cluster may have access to the secret. Use a service account which you want to be accessible to all the users with whom you share the Kubernetes cluster, and can revoke if they are compromised.
Now we can create a pod which references the secret with the ssh key and
consumes it in a volume:
```yaml
kind: Pod
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: secret-test-pod
labels:
name: secret-test
spec:
volumes:
- name: secret-volume
secret:
secretName: ssh-key-secret
containers:
- name: ssh-test-container
image: mySshImage
volumeMounts:
- name: secret-volume
readOnly: true
mountPath: "/etc/secret-volume"
```
When the container's command runs, the pieces of the key will be available in:
```shell
/etc/secret-volume/ssh-publickey
/etc/secret-volume/ssh-privatekey
```
The container is then free to use the secret data to establish an ssh connection.
### Use-Case: Pods with prod / test credentials
This example illustrates a pod which consumes a secret containing prod
credentials and another pod which consumes a secret with test environment
credentials.
Make the secrets:
```shell
$ kubectl create secret generic prod-db-secret --from-literal=username=produser --from-literal=password=Y4nys7f11
secret "prod-db-secret" created
$ kubectl create secret generic test-db-secret --from-literal=username=testuser --from-literal=password=iluvtests
secret "test-db-secret" created
```
{{< note >}}
**Note:** Special characters such as `$`, `\*`, and `!` require escaping.
If the password you are using has special characters, you need to escape them using the `\\` character. For example, if your actual password is `S!B\*d$zDsb`, you should execute the command this way:
kubectl create secret generic dev-db-secret --from-literal=username=devuser --from-literal=password=S\\!B\\\*d\\$zDsb
You do not need to escape special characters in passwords from files (`--from-file`).
{{< /note >}}
Now make the pods:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: List
items:
- kind: Pod
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: prod-db-client-pod
labels:
name: prod-db-client
spec:
volumes:
- name: secret-volume
secret:
secretName: prod-db-secret
containers:
- name: db-client-container
image: myClientImage
volumeMounts:
- name: secret-volume
readOnly: true
mountPath: "/etc/secret-volume"
- kind: Pod
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: test-db-client-pod
labels:
name: test-db-client
spec:
volumes:
- name: secret-volume
secret:
secretName: test-db-secret
containers:
- name: db-client-container
image: myClientImage
volumeMounts:
- name: secret-volume
readOnly: true
mountPath: "/etc/secret-volume"
```
Both containers will have the following files present on their filesystems with the values for each container's environment:
```shell
/etc/secret-volume/username
/etc/secret-volume/password
```
Note how the specs for the two pods differ only in one field; this facilitates
creating pods with different capabilities from a common pod config template.
You could further simplify the base pod specification by using two Service Accounts:
one called, say, `prod-user` with the `prod-db-secret`, and one called, say,
`test-user` with the `test-db-secret`. Then, the pod spec can be shortened to, for example:
```yaml
kind: Pod
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: prod-db-client-pod
labels:
name: prod-db-client
spec:
serviceAccount: prod-db-client
containers:
- name: db-client-container
image: myClientImage
```
### Use-case: Dotfiles in secret volume
In order to make piece of data 'hidden' (i.e., in a file whose name begins with a dot character), simply
make that key begin with a dot. For example, when the following secret is mounted into a volume:
```yaml
kind: Secret
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: dotfile-secret
data:
.secret-file: dmFsdWUtMg0KDQo=
---
kind: Pod
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: secret-dotfiles-pod
spec:
volumes:
- name: secret-volume
secret:
secretName: dotfile-secret
containers:
- name: dotfile-test-container
image: k8s.gcr.io/busybox
command:
- ls
- "-l"
- "/etc/secret-volume"
volumeMounts:
- name: secret-volume
readOnly: true
mountPath: "/etc/secret-volume"
```
The `secret-volume` will contain a single file, called `.secret-file`, and
the `dotfile-test-container` will have this file present at the path
`/etc/secret-volume/.secret-file`.
{{< note >}}
**Note**: Files beginning with dot characters are hidden from the output of `ls -l`;
you must use `ls -la` to see them when listing directory contents.
{{< /note >}}
### Use-case: Secret visible to one container in a pod
Consider a program that needs to handle HTTP requests, do some complex business
logic, and then sign some messages with an HMAC. Because it has complex
application logic, there might be an unnoticed remote file reading exploit in
the server, which could expose the private key to an attacker.
This could be divided into two processes in two containers: a frontend container
which handles user interaction and business logic, but which cannot see the
private key; and a signer container that can see the private key, and responds
to simple signing requests from the frontend (e.g. over localhost networking).
With this partitioned approach, an attacker now has to trick the application
server into doing something rather arbitrary, which may be harder than getting
it to read a file.
<!-- TODO: explain how to do this while still using automation. -->
## Best practices
### Clients that use the secrets API
When deploying applications that interact with the secrets API, access should be
limited using [authorization policies](
/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/) such as [RBAC](
/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/).
Secrets often hold values that span a spectrum of importance, many of which can
cause escalations within Kubernetes (e.g. service account tokens) and to
external systems. Even if an individual app can reason about the power of the
secrets it expects to interact with, other apps within the same namespace can
render those assumptions invalid.
For these reasons `watch` and `list` requests for secrets within a namespace are
extremely powerful capabilities and should be avoided, since listing secrets allows
the clients to inspect the values of all secrets that are in that namespace. The ability to
`watch` and `list` all secrets in a cluster should be reserved for only the most
privileged, system-level components.
Applications that need to access the secrets API should perform `get` requests on
the secrets they need. This lets administrators restrict access to all secrets
while [white-listing access to individual instances](
/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/#referring-to-resources) that
the app needs.
For improved performance over a looping `get`, clients can design resources that
reference a secret then `watch` the resource, re-requesting the secret when the
reference changes. Additionally, a ["bulk watch" API](
https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/design-proposals/api-machinery/bulk_watch.md)
to let clients `watch` individual resources has also been proposed, and will likely
be available in future releases of Kubernetes.
## Security Properties
### Protections
Because `secret` objects can be created independently of the `pods` that use
them, there is less risk of the secret being exposed during the workflow of
creating, viewing, and editing pods. The system can also take additional
precautions with `secret` objects, such as avoiding writing them to disk where
possible.
A secret is only sent to a node if a pod on that node requires it. It is not
written to disk. It is stored in a tmpfs. It is deleted once the pod that
depends on it is deleted.
On most Kubernetes-project-maintained distributions, communication between user
to the apiserver, and from apiserver to the kubelets, is protected by SSL/TLS.
Secrets are protected when transmitted over these channels.
Secret data on nodes is stored in tmpfs volumes and thus does not come to rest
on the node.
There may be secrets for several pods on the same node. However, only the
secrets that a pod requests are potentially visible within its containers.
Therefore, one Pod does not have access to the secrets of another pod.
There may be several containers in a pod. However, each container in a pod has
to request the secret volume in its `volumeMounts` for it to be visible within
the container. This can be used to construct useful [security partitions at the
Pod level](#use-case-secret-visible-to-one-container-in-a-pod).
### Risks
- In the API server secret data is stored as plaintext in etcd; therefore:
- Administrators should limit access to etcd to admin users
- Secret data in the API server is at rest on the disk that etcd uses; admins may want to wipe/shred disks
used by etcd when no longer in use
- If you configure the secret through a manifest (JSON or YAML) file which has
the secret data encoded as base64, sharing this file or checking it in to a
source repository means the secret is compromised. Base64 encoding is not an
encryption method and is considered the same as plain text.
- Applications still need to protect the value of secret after reading it from the volume,
such as not accidentally logging it or transmitting it to an untrusted party.
- A user who can create a pod that uses a secret can also see the value of that secret. Even
if apiserver policy does not allow that user to read the secret object, the user could
run a pod which exposes the secret.
- If multiple replicas of etcd are run, then the secrets will be shared between them.
By default, etcd does not secure peer-to-peer communication with SSL/TLS, though this can be configured.
- Currently, anyone with root on any node can read any secret from the apiserver,
by impersonating the kubelet. It is a planned feature to only send secrets to
nodes that actually require them, to restrict the impact of a root exploit on a
single node.
{{< note >}}
**Note:** As of 1.7 [encryption of secret data at rest is supported](/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/).
{{< /note >}}
{{% capture whatsnext %}}
{{% /capture %}}