Add passexec_cmd, passexec_expiration, kerberos_conn, tags, and
post_connection_sql to SharedServer so non-owners get their own
per-user values instead of inheriting the owner's. Drop the unused
db_res column which was never overlaid or writable by non-owners.
Key changes:
- New Alembic migration (sharedserver_feature_parity) adds 5 columns,
drops db_res, cleans up orphaned records. All operations idempotent.
- Overlay copies new fields from SharedServer instead of suppressing
- _owner_only_fields guard blocks non-owners from setting passexec_cmd,
passexec_expiration, db_res, db_res_type via API
- Non-owners can set post_connection_sql (runs under their own creds)
- update_tags and flag_modified use sharedserver for non-owners
- update() response returns sharedserver tags for non-owners
- ServerManager passexec suppression with config.SERVER_MODE guard
- UI: post_connection_sql editable for non-owners (readonly only when
connected, not when shared)
- SCHEMA_VERSION bumped to 51
- Comprehensive unit tests for overlay, write guards, and tag deltas
pgAdmin 4 in server mode had no data isolation between users — any
authenticated user could access other users' private servers,
background processes, and debugger state by guessing object IDs.
The shared server feature had 21 vulnerabilities including credential
leaks, privilege escalation via passexec_cmd, and owner data
corruption via SQLAlchemy session mutations.
Centralized access control:
- New server_access.py with get_server(), get_server_group(),
get_user_server_query() replacing ~20 unfiltered queries
- connection_manager() raises ObjectGone (HTTP 410) in server mode
when access is denied — fixes 155+ unguarded callers
- UserScopedMixin.for_user() on 10 models replaces scattered
user_id filters
Shared server isolation (all 21 audit issues):
- Expunge server from session before property merge to prevent
owner data corruption
- Suppress passexec_cmd, post_connection_sql for non-owners in
merge, API response, and ServerManager
- Override all 6 SSL/passfile connection_params keys from
SharedServer; strip owner-only keys; sanitize on creation
- _is_non_owner() helper centralises 15+ inline ownership checks
- SharedServer lookup uses (osid, user_id) not name
- Unique constraint on SharedServer(osid, user_id)
- Tunnel/DB password save, change_password, clear_saved_password,
clear_sshtunnel_password all branch on ownership
- Only owner can unshare (delete_shared_server guard)
- Session restore includes shared servers
- tunnel_port/tunnel_keep_alive copied from owner, not hardcoded
Tool/module hardening:
- All tool endpoints use get_server()
- Debugger function arguments scoped by user_id
- Background processes use Process.for_user()
- Workspace adhoc servers scoped to current user
Migration (schema version 49 -> 50):
- Add user_id to debugger_function_arguments composite PK
- Add indexes on server, sharedserver, servergroup
- Add unique constraint on sharedserver(osid, user_id)
1. Leverage rc-dock layout to restore the application state.
2. Move the save and load file endpoints to the file manager module.
3. Ensure that the order and layout of tabs is maintained on restore.
4. Persist the changed title of tabs on restore.
1) String literals should not be duplicated.
2) Prefer using an optional chain expression instead, as it's more concise and easier to read.
3) Expected the Promise rejection reason to be an Error.
2) Change the datatype of the value column of the setting table to text instead of a string. #5746
3) Fixed an issue where the key 'passfile' is not found. #4728
2) Fixed an issue where Kerberos authentication to the server is not imported/exported. #5732
3) Increase the length of the value column of the setting table. #5746
4) Upgrade Flask-Migrate to 4.0.0. #5525
Ashesh Vashi
Yogesh Mahajan
Akshay Joshi
Pravesh Sharma
Rohit Bhati
Aditya Toshniwal
Anil Sahoo
aelgn
Khushboo Vashi
Pradip Parkale
Florian Sabonchi
Nikhil Mohite