Revise “Encrypting Secret Data at Rest” (#18810)

* Drop reference to old Kubernetes versions

At the time of writing, Kubernetes v1.13 is the oldest supported
version, and encryption-at-rest is no longer alpha.

* Tidy whitespace

* Add table caption

* Set metadata for required Kubernetes version
pull/19018/head
Tim Bannister 2020-02-06 21:03:25 +00:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ reviewers:
- smarterclayton
title: Encrypting Secret Data at Rest
content_template: templates/task
min-kubernetes-server-version: 1.13
---
{{% capture overview %}}
@ -13,9 +14,7 @@ This page shows how to enable and configure encryption of secret data at rest.
* {{< include "task-tutorial-prereqs.md" >}} {{< version-check >}}
* Kubernetes version 1.13.0 or later is required
* etcd v3 or later is required
* etcd v3.0 or later is required
{{% /capture %}}
@ -27,9 +26,6 @@ The `kube-apiserver` process accepts an argument `--encryption-provider-config`
that controls how API data is encrypted in etcd. An example configuration
is provided below.
Note:
The alpha version of the encryption feature prior to 1.13 used the `--experimental-encryption-provider-config` flag.
## Understanding the encryption at rest configuration.
```yaml
@ -69,10 +65,6 @@ resources from storage each provider that matches the stored data attempts to de
order. If no provider can read the stored data due to a mismatch in format or secret key, an error
is returned which prevents clients from accessing that resource.
Note:
The alpha version of the encryption feature prior to 1.13 required to be configured with
`kind: EncryptionConfig` and `apiVersion: v1`.
{{< caution >}}
**IMPORTANT:** If any resource is not readable via the encryption config (because keys were changed),
the only recourse is to delete that key from the underlying etcd directly. Calls that attempt to
@ -81,11 +73,12 @@ read that resource will fail until it is deleted or a valid decryption key is pr
### Providers:
{{< table caption="Providers for Kubernetes encryption at rest" >}}
Name | Encryption | Strength | Speed | Key Length | Other Considerations
-----|------------|----------|-------|------------|---------------------
`identity` | None | N/A | N/A | N/A | Resources written as-is without encryption. When set as the first provider, the resource will be decrypted as new values are written.
`aescbc` | AES-CBC with PKCS#7 padding | Strongest | Fast | 32-byte | The recommended choice for encryption at rest but may be slightly slower than `secretbox`.
`secretbox` | XSalsa20 and Poly1305 | Strong | Faster | 32-byte | A newer standard and may not be considered acceptable in environments that require high levels of review.
`secretbox` | XSalsa20 and Poly1305 | Strong | Faster | 32-byte | A newer standard and may not be considered acceptable in environments that require high levels of review.
`aesgcm` | AES-GCM with random nonce | Must be rotated every 200k writes | Fastest | 16, 24, or 32-byte | Is not recommended for use except when an automated key rotation scheme is implemented.
`kms` | Uses envelope encryption scheme: Data is encrypted by data encryption keys (DEKs) using AES-CBC with PKCS#7 padding, DEKs are encrypted by key encryption keys (KEKs) according to configuration in Key Management Service (KMS) | Strongest | Fast | 32-bytes | The recommended choice for using a third party tool for key management. Simplifies key rotation, with a new DEK generated for each encryption, and KEK rotation controlled by the user. [Configure the KMS provider](/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider/)
@ -95,12 +88,12 @@ is the first provider, the first key is used for encryption.
__Storing the raw encryption key in the EncryptionConfig only moderately improves your security posture, compared to no encryption.
Please use `kms` provider for additional security.__ By default, the `identity` provider is used to protect secrets in etcd, which
provides no encryption. `EncryptionConfiguration` was introduced to encrypt secrets locally, with a locally managed key.
Encrypting secrets with a locally managed key protects against an etcd compromise, but it fails to protect against a host compromise.
Since the encryption keys are stored on the host in the EncryptionConfig YAML file, a skilled attacker can access that file and
extract the encryption keys. This was a stepping stone in development to the `kms` provider, introduced in 1.10, and beta since 1.12. Envelope encryption
creates dependence on a separate key, not stored in Kubernetes. In this case, an attacker would need to compromise etcd, the
kubeapi-server, and the third-party KMS provider to retrieve the plaintext values, providing a higher level of security than
locally-stored encryption keys.
extract the encryption keys.
Envelope encryption creates dependence on a separate key, not stored in Kubernetes. In this case, an attacker would need to compromise etcd, the kubeapi-server, and the third-party KMS provider to retrieve the plaintext values, providing a higher level of security than locally-stored encryption keys.
## Encrypting your data
@ -137,7 +130,7 @@ Your config file contains keys that can decrypt content in etcd, so you must pro
{{< /caution >}}
## Verifying that data is encrypted
## Verifying that data is encrypted
Data is encrypted when written to etcd. After restarting your `kube-apiserver`, any newly created or
updated secret should be encrypted when stored. To check, you can use the `etcdctl` command line
@ -217,5 +210,3 @@ and restart all `kube-apiserver` processes. Then run the command `kubectl get se
to force all secrets to be decrypted.
{{% /capture %}}