fixed the RBAC good practice guide.

pull/33961/head
harshitasao 2022-05-26 12:15:20 +05:30
parent 85416c0c21
commit 789935a35d
1 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -37,13 +37,14 @@ some general rules that can be applied are :
can avoid accidental modification of cluster resources.
- Avoid adding users to the `system:masters` group. Any user who is a member of this group
bypasses all RBAC rights checks and will always have unrestricted superuser access, which cannot be
revoked by removing Role Bindings or Cluster Role Bindings. As an aside, if a cluster is
revoked by removing RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings. As an aside, if a cluster is
using an authorization webhook, membership of this group also bypasses that webhook (requests
from users who are members of that group are never sent to the webhook)
### Minimize distribution of privileged tokens
Ideally, pods shouldn't be assigned service accounts granted powerful permissions (listed [here](#Kubernetes-RBAC---Privilege-Escalation-Risks)).
Ideally, pods shouldn't be assigned service accounts that have been granted powerful permissions (for example, any of the rights listed under
[privilege escalation risks](#privilege-escalation-risks)).
In cases where a workload requires powerful permissions, consider the following practices:
- Limit the number of nodes running powerful pods. Ensure that any DaemonSets you run
@ -172,4 +173,7 @@ specifically relevant in multi-tenant clusters if semi-trusted or untrusted user
are allowed limited access to a system.
One option for mitigation of this issue would be to use [resource quotas](/docs/concepts/policy/resource-quotas/#object-count-quota)
to limit the quantity of objects which can be created.
to limit the quantity of objects which can be created.
## {{% heading "whatsnext" %}}
* To learn more about **RBAC**, see [RBAC documentation](/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/).