mirror of https://github.com/nucypher/nucypher.git
192 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
192 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
import asyncio
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import msgpack
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import pytest
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from kademlia.utils import digest
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from nkms.characters import Ursula, Character
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from nkms.crypto.signature import Signature
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from nkms.crypto.utils import BytestringSplitter
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from nkms.network import blockchain_client
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from nkms.network.protocols import dht_value_splitter
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from nkms.policy.models import Policy
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from tests.utilities import MockNetworkyStuff, EVENT_LOOP, URSULA_PORT, NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_NETWORK
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def test_all_ursulas_know_about_all_other_ursulas(ursulas):
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"""
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Once launched, all Ursulas know about - and can help locate - all other Ursulas in the network.
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"""
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ignorance = []
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for acounter, announcing_ursula in enumerate(blockchain_client._ursulas_on_blockchain):
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for counter, propagating_ursula in enumerate(ursulas):
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if not digest(announcing_ursula) in propagating_ursula.server.storage:
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ignorance.append((counter, acounter))
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if ignorance:
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pytest.fail(str(["{} didn't know about {}".format(counter, acounter) for counter, acounter in ignorance]))
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def test_vladimir_illegal_interface_key_does_not_propagate(ursulas):
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"""
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Although Ursulas propagate each other's interface information, as demonstrated above, they do not propagate
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interface information for Vladimir, an Evil Ursula.
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"""
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vladimir = ursulas[0]
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ursula = ursulas[1]
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# Ursula hasn't seen any illegal keys.
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assert ursula.server.protocol.illegal_keys_seen == []
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# Vladimir does almost everything right....
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value = vladimir.interface_dht_value()
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# Except he sets an illegal key for his interface.
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illegal_key = "Not allowed to set arbitrary key for this."
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setter = vladimir.server.set(key=illegal_key, value=value)
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loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
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loop.run_until_complete(setter)
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# Now Ursula has seen an illegal key.
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assert digest(illegal_key) in ursula.server.protocol.illegal_keys_seen
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def test_alice_cannot_offer_policy_without_first_finding_ursula(alice, bob, ursulas):
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"""
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Alice can't just offer a Policy if she doesn't know whether any Ursulas are available (she gets Ursula.NotFound).
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"""
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networky_stuff = MockNetworkyStuff(ursulas)
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policy = Policy(alice, bob)
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with pytest.raises(Ursula.NotFound):
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policy_offer = policy.encrypt_payload_for_ursula()
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def test_trying_to_find_unknown_actor_raises_not_found(alice):
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"""
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Tony the test character can't make reference to a character he doesn't know about yet.
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"""
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tony_clifton = Character()
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message = b"some_message"
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signature = alice.seal(message)
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# Tony can't reference Alice...
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with pytest.raises(Character.NotFound):
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verification = tony_clifton.verify_from(alice, signature, message)
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# ...before learning about Alice.
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tony_clifton.learn_about_actor(alice)
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verification, NO_DECRYPTION_PERFORMED = tony_clifton.verify_from(alice, message, signature)
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assert verification is True
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def test_alice_finds_ursula(alice, ursulas):
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"""
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With the help of any Ursula, Alice can find a specific Ursula.
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"""
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ursula_index = 1
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all_ursulas = blockchain_client._ursulas_on_blockchain
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getter = alice.server.get(all_ursulas[ursula_index])
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loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
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value = loop.run_until_complete(getter)
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_signature, _ursula_pubkey_sig, _hrac, interface_info = dht_value_splitter(value.lstrip(b"uaddr-"),
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return_remainder=True)
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port = msgpack.loads(interface_info)[0]
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assert port == URSULA_PORT + ursula_index
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def test_alice_creates_policy_group_with_correct_hrac(alices_policy_group):
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"""
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Alice creates a PolicyGroup. It has the proper HRAC, unique per her, Bob, and the uri (resource_id).
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"""
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alice = alices_policy_group.alice
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bob = alices_policy_group.bob
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assert alices_policy_group.hrac() == alices_policy_group.hash(
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bytes(alice.seal) + bytes(bob.seal) + alice.__resource_id)
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def test_alice_sets_treasure_map_on_network(enacted_policy_group, ursulas):
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"""
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Having enacted all the policies of a PolicyGroup, Alice creates a TreasureMap and sends it to Ursula via the DHT.
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"""
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_, packed_encrypted_treasure_map, _, _ = enacted_policy_group.publish_treasure_map()
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treasure_map_as_set_on_network = ursulas[0].server.storage[
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digest(enacted_policy_group.treasure_map_dht_key())]
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assert treasure_map_as_set_on_network == b"trmap" + packed_encrypted_treasure_map
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def test_treasure_map_with_bad_id_does_not_propagate(alices_policy_group, ursulas):
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"""
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In order to prevent spam attacks, Ursula refuses to propagate a TreasureMap whose PolicyGroup ID does not comport to convention.
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"""
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illegal_policygroup_id = "This is not a conventional policygroup id"
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alice = alices_policy_group.alice
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bob = alices_policy_group.bob
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treasure_map = alices_policy_group.treasure_map
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encrypted_treasure_map, signature = alice.encrypt_for(bob, treasure_map.packed_payload())
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packed_encrypted_treasure_map = msgpack.dumps(encrypted_treasure_map) # TODO: #114? Do we even need to pack here?
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setter = alice.server.set(illegal_policygroup_id, packed_encrypted_treasure_map)
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_set_event = EVENT_LOOP.run_until_complete(setter)
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with pytest.raises(KeyError):
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ursulas[0].server.storage[digest(illegal_policygroup_id)]
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@pytest.mark.usefixtures("treasure_map_is_set_on_dht")
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def test_treasure_map_stored_by_ursula_is_the_correct_one_for_bob(alice, bob, ursulas, enacted_policy_group):
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"""
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The TreasureMap given by Alice to Ursula is the correct one for Bob; he can decrypt and read it.
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"""
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treasure_map_as_set_on_network = ursulas[0].server.storage[
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digest(enacted_policy_group.treasure_map_dht_key())]
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_signature_for_ursula, pubkey_sig_alice, hrac, encrypted_treasure_map = dht_value_splitter(
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treasure_map_as_set_on_network[5::], msgpack_remainder=True) # 5:: to account for prepended "trmap"
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verified, cleartext = treasure_map_as_decrypted_by_bob = bob.verify_from(alice,
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encrypted_treasure_map,
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decrypt=True,
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signature_is_on_cleartext=True,
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)
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_alices_signature, treasure_map_as_decrypted_by_bob = BytestringSplitter(Signature)(cleartext, return_remainder=True)
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assert treasure_map_as_decrypted_by_bob == enacted_policy_group.treasure_map.packed_payload()
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assert verified is True
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@pytest.mark.usefixtures("treasure_map_is_set_on_dht")
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def test_bob_can_retreive_the_treasure_map_and_decrypt_it(enacted_policy_group, ursulas):
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"""
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Above, we showed that the TreasureMap saved on the network is the correct one for Bob. Here, we show
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that Bob can retrieve it with only the information about which he is privy pursuant to the PolicyGroup.
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"""
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bob = enacted_policy_group.bob
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networky_stuff = MockNetworkyStuff(ursulas)
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# Of course, in the real world, Bob has sufficient information to reconstitute a PolicyGroup, gleaned, we presume,
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# through a side-channel with Alice.
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treasure_map_from_wire = bob.get_treasure_map(enacted_policy_group)
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assert enacted_policy_group.treasure_map == treasure_map_from_wire
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def test_treaure_map_is_legit(enacted_policy_group):
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"""
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Sure, the TreasureMap can get to Bob, but we also need to know that each Ursula in the TreasureMap is on the network.
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"""
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alice = enacted_policy_group.alice
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for ursula_interface_id in enacted_policy_group.treasure_map:
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getter = alice.server.get(ursula_interface_id)
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loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
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value = loop.run_until_complete(getter)
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signature, ursula_pubkey_sig, hrac, interface_info = dht_value_splitter(value.lstrip(b"uaddr-"),
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return_remainder=True)
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port = msgpack.loads(interface_info)[0]
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legal_ports = range(NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_NETWORK, NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_NETWORK + URSULA_PORT)
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assert port in legal_ports
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