nucypher/tests/network/test_network_actors.py

158 lines
6.5 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import pytest
from kademlia.utils import digest
from nucypher.crypto.api import keccak_digest
from tests.utilities import MockRestMiddleware
@pytest.mark.usefixtures('testerchain')
def test_all_ursulas_know_about_all_other_ursulas(ursulas, three_agents):
"""
Once launched, all Ursulas know about - and can help locate - all other Ursulas in the network.
"""
token_agent, miner_agent, policy_agent = three_agents
ignorance = []
for acounter, announcing_ursula in enumerate(miner_agent.swarm()):
for counter, propagating_ursula in enumerate(ursulas):
announcing_ursula_ether_address, announcing_ursula_id = announcing_ursula
if not digest(bytes(announcing_ursula_id)) in propagating_ursula.server.storage:
ignorance.append((counter, acounter))
if ignorance:
pytest.fail(str(["{} didn't know about {}".format(counter, acounter) for counter, acounter in ignorance]))
def test_vladimir_illegal_interface_key_does_not_propagate(ursulas):
"""
Although Ursulas propagate each other's interface information, as demonstrated above, they do not propagate
interface information for Vladimir, an Evil Ursula.
"""
ursulas = list(ursulas)
vladimir, ursula = ursulas[0], ursulas[1]
# Ursula hasn't seen any illegal keys.
assert ursula.dht_server.protocol.illegal_keys_seen == []
# Vladimir does almost everything right....
value = vladimir.interface_info_with_metadata()
# Except he sets an illegal key for his interface.
illegal_key = b"Not allowed to set arbitrary key for this."
setter = vladimir.dht_server.set(key=illegal_key, value=value)
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
loop.run_until_complete(setter)
# Now Ursula has seen an illegal key.
assert digest(illegal_key) in ursula.dht_server.protocol.illegal_keys_seen
@pytest.mark.skip("What do we want this test to do now?")
def test_alice_finds_ursula_via_rest(alice, ursulas):
# Imagine alice knows of nobody.
alice._known_nodes = {}
some_ursula_interface = ursulas.pop().rest_interface
new_nodes = alice.learn_from_teacher_node()
assert len(new_nodes) == len(ursulas)
for ursula in ursulas:
assert ursula.stamp.as_umbral_pubkey() in new_nodes
def test_alice_creates_policy_with_correct_hrac(idle_federated_policy):
"""
Alice creates a Policy. It has the proper HRAC, unique per her, Bob, and the uri (resource_id).
"""
alice = idle_federated_policy.alice
bob = idle_federated_policy.bob
assert idle_federated_policy.hrac() == keccak_digest(
bytes(alice.stamp) + bytes(bob.stamp) + idle_federated_policy.label)
def test_alice_sets_treasure_map(enacted_federated_policy, ursulas):
"""
Having enacted all the policies of a PolicyGroup, Alice creates a TreasureMap and sends it to Ursula via the DHT.
"""
networky_stuff = MockRestMiddleware()
enacted_federated_policy.publish_treasure_map(network_middleare=networky_stuff)
treasure_map_as_set_on_network = list(ursulas)[0].treasure_maps[
digest(enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map.public_id())]
assert treasure_map_as_set_on_network == enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map
@pytest.mark.skip("Needs cleanup.")
def test_treasure_map_with_bad_id_does_not_propagate(idle_federated_policy, ursulas):
"""
In order to prevent spam attacks, Ursula refuses to propagate a TreasureMap whose PolicyGroup ID does not comport to convention.
"""
illegal_policygroup_id = b"This is not a conventional policygroup id"
alice = idle_federated_policy.alice
bob = idle_federated_policy.bob
treasure_map = idle_federated_policy.treasure_map
message_kit, signature = alice.encrypt_for(bob, treasure_map.packed_payload())
alice.network_middleware.put_treasure_map_on_node(node=ursulas[1],
map_id=illegal_policygroup_id,
map_payload=message_kit.to_bytes())
# setter = alice.server.set(illegal_policygroup_id, message_kit.to_bytes())
# _set_event = TEST_EVENT_LOOP.run_until_complete(setter)
# with pytest.raises(KeyError):
# _ = ursulas_on_network[0].server.storage[digest(illegal_policygroup_id)]
assert False
def test_treasure_map_stored_by_ursula_is_the_correct_one_for_bob(alice, bob, ursulas, enacted_federated_policy):
"""
The TreasureMap given by Alice to Ursula is the correct one for Bob; he can decrypt and read it.
"""
treasure_map_as_set_on_network = list(ursulas)[0].treasure_maps[
digest(enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map.public_id())]
hrac_by_bob = bob.construct_policy_hrac(alice.stamp, enacted_federated_policy.label)
assert enacted_federated_policy.hrac() == hrac_by_bob
map_id_by_bob = bob.construct_map_id(alice.stamp, enacted_federated_policy.label)
assert map_id_by_bob == treasure_map_as_set_on_network.public_id()
def test_bob_can_retreive_the_treasure_map_and_decrypt_it(enacted_federated_policy, ursulas):
"""
Above, we showed that the TreasureMap saved on the network is the correct one for Bob. Here, we show
that Bob can retrieve it with only the information about which he is privy pursuant to the PolicyGroup.
"""
bob = enacted_federated_policy.bob
# Of course, in the real world, Bob has sufficient information to reconstitute a PolicyGroup, gleaned, we presume,
# through a side-channel with Alice.
# If Bob doesn't know about any Ursulas, he can't find the TreasureMap via the REST swarm:
with pytest.raises(bob.NotEnoughUrsulas):
treasure_map_from_wire = bob.get_treasure_map(enacted_federated_policy.alice.stamp,
enacted_federated_policy.label)
# Let's imagine he has learned about some - say, from the blockchain.
bob._known_nodes = {u.canonical_public_address: u for u in ursulas}
# Now try.
treasure_map_from_wire = bob.get_treasure_map(enacted_federated_policy.alice.stamp,
enacted_federated_policy.label)
assert enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map == treasure_map_from_wire
def test_treaure_map_is_legit(enacted_federated_policy):
"""
Sure, the TreasureMap can get to Bob, but we also need to know that each Ursula in the TreasureMap is on the network.
"""
for ursula_address in enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map:
assert ursula_address in enacted_federated_policy.bob._known_nodes