mirror of https://github.com/mirror/busybox.git
Steve Grubb writes:
Hello, Last November a bug was found in iproute. CAN-2003-0856 has more information. Basically, netlink packets can come from any user. If a program performs action based on netlink packets, they must be examined to make sure they came from the place they are expected (the kernel). Attached is a patch against pre8. Please apply this before releasing 1.00 final. All users of busy box may be vulnerable to local attacks without it. Best Regards, Steve Grubb1_00_stable_10817
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5ec58285c3
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6c8161d69f
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@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ int rtnl_dump_filter(struct rtnl_handle *rth,
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while (NLMSG_OK(h, status)) {
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int err;
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if (h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid ||
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if (nladdr.nl_pid != 0 ||
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h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid ||
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h->nlmsg_seq != rth->dump) {
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if (junk) {
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err = junk(&nladdr, h, arg2);
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@ -270,7 +271,8 @@ int rtnl_talk(struct rtnl_handle *rtnl, struct nlmsghdr *n, pid_t peer,
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bb_error_msg_and_die("!!!malformed message: len=%d", len);
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}
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if (h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid ||
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if (nladdr.nl_pid != peer ||
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h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid ||
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h->nlmsg_seq != seq) {
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if (junk) {
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l_err = junk(&nladdr, h, jarg);
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